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MONTEREY PENIN. AIRPORT DIST.

v.

MASON.

[19 C. (2d)

accomplish certain objectives necessary for the protection of
the public health, safety and morals, the legislature may enact
more specific legislation dealing with the subject without violating the constitutional inhibition aimed at special legislation. This was recognized in the case of American River
Flood Oontrol District v. Sweet, 214 Cal. 778 [7 Pac. (2d)
1030], which presented a situation and problem analogous to
those here presented. The cited CMe points out that· the Ventura case, supra, relied on here by respondent, recognizes
"that special legislation might coexist with a general law on
the subject, and that it would be deemed a valid exerGiseof
legislative power untIl it is demonstrated that a general law
could be made applicable." It also points out, which is also
significant here, that "the general law is permissive only. The
initiation of proceedings for the formation of such districts
under general law must depend on the voluntary petition of
land owners in the district. The land owners in the district
might never file, or might indefinitely delay the filing of, such
a petition. Here the district is created by the special act. It
has no alternative but to function and carry out the purposes
of the act. The act contemplates the safeguards of life.and
property. . . . The project contemplated by the act is one of
the essential parts of the co-ordinated plan . . . . The federal
act made certain appropriations in aid of the plan provide9
for by the act here in question, conditioned . . . on assurances that appropriations would be made by the State of Cali~
fornia . . . . "
The facts of the present case are even more compelling than
those of the cited case. Here, the legislature in providing for
the protection of alarge and populous area has createdapu,blic corporation to execute an important unit of the natiol1.al·
defense plan. The accomplishment of this project presents a
problem unlike any other existing in the state and the ill;,:tchinery of the general law is inadequate to accomplish the
objective. The legislature, in its wisdom, has determined tha.t
a solution of the problem lies only in the creation of a separate and special entity. It is not our province to interfere
with that determination.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed, and pursuant to stipulation of the parties., here filed, waiving t4e
statutory time within which such writ may issue, it is further
ordered that such peremptory writ may issue upon the filiri g
of this decision.
'
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BEN BARD, as Special Administrator, etc., Respondent, v.
L.E. KENT, Individually and as Director, etc., Appellants.
[1] Contracts - Consent - Continuing Offer or "Option" - As
Affected by Consideration.-An option is an offer which is revoked by the death of the offeror prior to acceptance if it is
without consideration, but is a contract binding upon him and
his Successors in interest after his death if a consideration is
given. (See Civ. Code, § 1587, subd. 4.)

ld.-Consideration ~ Sufficiency - Agreement of Offeror.If the· holder of an option to extend a lease pays the architect's fee for sketches of proposed improvements on the demised premises, there is a consideration sufficient to make the
option irre.vocable, provided the offeror agrees t.o accept it as
su.ch~ However, no act of an offeree can constitute a consideration binding upon the offeror unless the latter agrees to be
bound in return therefor.
[3] Cancellation-Actions-Evidence-Weight and Su:ffi.ciencyConsideration for Option.-Inan action to cancel an option to
extend a lease, the evidence justified the trial court in concluding that the optionor did not promise to. grant the option in
return for the engaging of an architect to draw plans for
proposed improvements on the demised premises, where it
showed merely that the optionor stated the conditions under
which she was willing to extend the lease and that she suggested the engaging of an architect.
Estoppel - Equitable Estoppel - Promissory Estoppel.-To
render applicable the doctrine of promissory ·estoppel by vir. trie of which a promisor who has received no considel ation is
nevertheless bound by his promise when he has indu0ed an.. other to suffer detriment in reliance thereon, there must be .:t
promise on which reliance may be based.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
wngeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, JUdge. Affirmed.
See 6 Cal. Jur. 48-53.
See 6 Cal: Jur. 168, 169.
:. Dig.' References: [1] Contracts, §§ 17, 18; [2] Contracts,.
,[31 Cancellation,§ 76; [4] Estoppel, §20.
19 O. (2d)·-15
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Action to cancel an option to extend a lease. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.
Bautzer & Ryan, Gregson Bautzer, G. Bentley Ryan, Perry
Bertram and Bertin Weyl, Jr., for Appellants.
Paul Vallee and Jerome H. Kann for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The defendant in this action, L. E. Kent,
administered the business affairs of Mrs. Ruth Roland Bard,
hereinafter referred to as Miss Roland, under a general power
of attorney for many years before .her death. In 1933, Kent,
acting as agent for Miss Roland, leased for five years a parcel
of real property owned by her to Cliff Odums and Albert
M. Berkson, who constructed a building on the property and
installed equipment for the operation of a restaurant named
the Cat and the Fiddle. The restaurant failed, and Odums and
Berkson abandoned the venture. Thereupon Kent, acting in
his personal capacity, together with Howard Hastings and
Don Carpenter, organized a corporation, known as the Cat
and the Fiddle Company, which assumed the obligations of
Odums and Berkson and took over the operation of the restaurant. When this venture likewise proved unprofitable,
Kent bought the stock of· Hastings and Carpenter in the Cat
and the Fiddle Company and continued to payoff the obligations that the company had assumed. Various sublessees who
thereafter tried to operate a restaurant on the premises were
unsuccessful.
On August 21, 1935, Miss Roland executed a lease of the
premises to the Cat and the Fiddle Company for a term of
five years. The lessee subsequently obtained an extension of
the lease and written authority to sublease the premises to
M. A. McDonnell. On August 30, 1935, the premises were
subleased to :McDonnell for a term of five years ending
August 31, 1940, with an· option to renew the lease for one
year. This lease from the Cat and the Fiddle Company to
McDonnell included the right to use the equipment and fixtures on the premises and provided for rental payments of
10% of the gross receipts up to $6,000 and 8% of the gross
receipts. over that amount, with a minimum payment of $450
per month. The restaurant operated by McDonnell proved
highly successful, and he made improvements costing approximately $30,000. Meanwhile Kent dissolved the corporation,
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distributed its assets to himself, and continued· his business
as an individual under the fictitious name of the Cat and the
Fiddle Company. As owner of the improvements upOn the
property he received half of the rent, but upon termination
of the lease the improvements were to revert to Miss Roland.
During 1936 McDonnell told Miss Roland and Kent that
he would undertake additional improvements at a cost of
about $10,000 if his lease were extended for another four
years. Miss Roland in subsequent conversations with Kent
expressed a willingness to grant the extension if the proposed improvements would cost approximately $10,000. She
suggested that Kent check the figures and have an architect
draw· sketches for the purpose of making an estimate. On
August 17, 1937, Miss Roland executed to the Cat and the
Fiddle Company an option to extend its lease for an additional four years in order that it in turn could give McDonnell an extension of his lease. The option was signed for
Miss Roland by Kent as her attorney in fact. It recited that
"For consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration" the Cat and the Fiddle Company was
granted an option to extend its lease for an additional period
of four years. After the option was signed, Kent instructed
Kenneth McDonald, an architect, to draw sketches of the
proposed improvements. These sketches were billed to Kent
and paid for by him subsequent to the deaths of the architect and Miss Roland.
On September· 22, 1937, before the option was exercised,
Miss Roland died. The special administrator of her estate
brought this action against Kent to cancel and set aside the
option on the grounds that it Was not only given without
consideration and therefol"e revoked by the death of the
offeror, but that it was obtained by fraud. It was stipulated
that the sum of $10 was not paid to Miss Roland and that
none of the proposed improvements were made. The trial
court found that defendant made a complete disclosure of
all the transactions to Miss Roland and that he was not
guilty of any fraud or wrongdoing in his dealings with her.
The court also found, however, that there was no consideration given for the· option and that it was therefore revoked
by Miss Roland's death. Defendant has appealed from the
judgment in favor of plaintiff.
[1] An option is an offer and if it is without considera..
tion, it is revoked by the death of the offeror prior to accep-

452

BARD

v.

KENT.

[19 C. (2d)

tance. If consideration is given, it is a contract binding upon
the offeror and upon his successors in interest after his'death.
(See case cited in 6 Cal. Jur., pp. 48-53, secs. 27, 28, 29;
Williston, Contracts (revised ed.), secs. 61, 62; Cal. Civ.
Code, sec. 1587 (4) .) Since the trial court found that no consideration was given for the option in question, the judgment
must be upheld if the finding is supported by sufficient· evidence.
[2] Defendant contends that his payment of the architect's fee for sketches of the proposed improvements is a
consideration sufficient to make the option irrevocable. There
is no doubt that such payment would be consideration for
an option if the offeror agreed to accept it as such. (Marsh
v. LoU, 8 Cal. App. 384 [97 Pac. 163] ; Chrisman v. Southern
Calif. Edison Co., 83 Cal. App. 249 [256 Pac. 618] ; 6 Cal~
Jur. 168, 169, sec. 117; 1 Williston, Contracts (Revised ed.),
secs. 102, 102a; Rest. Contracts, sec. 75; see Hemenway v.
Abbott, 8 Cal. App. 450 [97 Pac. 190]:) No act of an offeree,
however, can constitute consideration binding upon the offeror
unless the latter agrees to be bound in return therefor. (Wil.:
Hams v. Hasshagen, 166 Cal. 386, 390 [137 Pac. 9J; Sha,dburne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355, 359 [18 Pac. 403] ; Oommercial
Bank v. Redfield, 122 Cal. 405, 409 [55 Pac. 160, 772] ; Tiffany & Co. v. Spreckels, 202 Cal. 778, 790 [262 Pac. 742J.
See Williston, Contracts (revised ed.), sec. 61, at pp. 180,
181, note 16; secs. 100, 102, 102a.) In the words of the
Restatement of Contracts (sec. 75): "Consideration must
actually be bargained for as the exchange for the promise.
. . . The existence or non-existence of a bargain where something has been parted with by the promisee or received by
the promisor. depends upon the manifested intention of the
parties. . . . The fact that the promisee relies on the promise
to his injury, or the promisor ,gains some advantage therefrom, does Dot establish consideration without the element of
bargain or agreed exchange. "
[3] In the present case the trial court was justified in
concluding from the evidence that Miss Roland did not promise to grant the option in return for Kent's engaging the
architect. Under this interpretation of the evidence' Miss
Roland merely stated the .conditions under which she was
willing to extend the lease. Although, according to Kent's
testimony, she suggested engaging an architect to check the
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figures on the proposed improvements, this suggestion did
not constitute a promise by her to grant the option if that
were done. Kent employed the architect to convince her that
the necessary conditions existed, but she made no promise to
extend the lease in the event they did". and remained free to
withdraw her offer at any time before acceptance. Kent could
have exercised the option as soon as it was executed, but he
chose instead to wait rather than to undertake immediately
the obligations incident to leasing the property for another
four years. The engagement of the architect was to actuate
Miss Roland to keep her offer open, but it did not. constitute
consideration binding her to do so. At best the evidence created a conflict for the trial court to resolve. (Estate o/Thomson, 165 Cal. 290 [131 Pac. 1045].)
[4] Defendant contends that in engaging the architect
he acted' in reliance upon the option given him by Miss Roland
to extend the lease, and that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel a promisor who has received no consideration
is nevertheless bound by his promise when he has induced
another to suffer detriment in reliance thereon. (See Rest.
Contracts, sec. 90; 1 Williston, Contracts (revised ed.), sec.
139.) There must, however, be a promise on which reliance
may be based. (See Medberry v. Olcovich, 15 Cal. App.
(2d) 263 [59 Pac. (2d) 551, 60 Pac. (2d) 2811; Lasar v.
Johnson, 125 Cal. 549 [58 Pac. 161] ; University of Southern
Calif. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39 [283 Pac. 949] ; Magee v.
Magee, 174 Cal. 276 [162 Pac. 1023].) Defendant did not
plead the issue of promissory estoppel at the trial, and there
is nothing ,in the record to show that Miss Roland at any
time promised to keep the option open or made any other
promise on which defendant could rely. She merely made
without consideration an offer, which was never accepted, to
renew the lease.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser,
J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 9,
1942.

